Resale Price Maintenance, Refusals to Deal, and the Gasoline Retailer - A Search for Alternative Remedial Deterrents by McCarthy, Richard C.
Volume 18 Issue 4 Article 3 
1973 
Resale Price Maintenance, Refusals to Deal, and the Gasoline 
Retailer - A Search for Alternative Remedial Deterrents 
Richard C. McCarthy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard C. McCarthy, Resale Price Maintenance, Refusals to Deal, and the Gasoline Retailer - A Search for 
Alternative Remedial Deterrents, 18 Vill. L. Rev. 648 (1973). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss4/3 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
[VOL. 18
COMMENTS
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, REFUSALS TO DEAL, AND
THE GASOLINE RETAILER - A SEARCH FOR
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIAL DETERRENTS
"The whole logic of private enterprise rests on the fundamental
assumption of active competition in free markets. If such a system
is to be preserved, it is essential that competition be kept active
and markets free."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The tremendous economic power enjoyed by the oil refiner in its
relations with gasoline retailers is amply documented.2 Merely to state
that there is an inequality in bargaining position grossly understates the
true nature of the relationship. For it is the pervasiveness of this power
which enables the oil refiner to control the retail distribution of gasoline,
even in the absence of vertical integration,3 and despite a strong govern-
mental policy to frustrate anticompetitive forces at all stages of the
marketing complex.
4
Various economic arguments have been advanced in support of the
control exercised by the oil refiners.5 The period when the major refiners
operated the retailing function through salaried employees is not so far
removed as to eliminate the disquieting possibility that the refiners might
1. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 488 (6th ed. 1964),
quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, COMMITTEE ON CARTELS AND MONOPOLY.
2. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 368 (1965) ; Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 476-78 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967) ; Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 344 F.2d 599,
606 (6th Cir. 1965); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 400 (7th
Cir. 1964). See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 90-91 (1955) ; Howrey, Interplay of Unfair Competition and Anti-
trust Doctrines Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 13 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1313, 1321-25 (1968); Prewitt, Reply to Professor Dixon's Comment on the
Federal Trade Commission's Report on Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
1383, 1422 (1968) ; 63 MICH. L. REV. 713, 719 (1965).
3. A manufacturer or refiner and a retailer would normally not be in direct com-
petition with each other, nor would they generally be operating at the same functional
level. But where a manufacturer or refiner moves into distribution by forward ex-
pansion so that it markets its products at the same functional level as the retailer, it
is said to have vertically integrated.
4. FTC, REPORT ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN THE MARKETING OF GASO-
LINE (1967) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT ON GASOLINE MARKETING]. See
Dixon, The FTC Report on Gasoline Marketing: A Comment, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
105 (1968) ; Gregory, A Survey of the Price Discrimination Aspects of the Federal
Trade Commission's Report on Gasoline Marketing, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 767 (1968) ;
Jones, Marketing Strategy and Government Regulation in Dual Distribution Practices,
34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 456 (1966) ; Prewitt, supra note 2.
5. Borowitz, Pricing Problems in Distributor and Franchise Systems, 38 U. CIN.
L. REV. 258 (1969) ; Dixon, supra note 4, at 125-26; Wade, Some Antitrust Problems
in Terminating Franchises, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 23, 30-31, 34-35 (1969).
(648)
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revert to this marketing approach, especially if judicial construction of the
antitrust laws prevents the exercise of any control.6 Furthermore, the
gasoline wars of past years were largely responsible for the initiation of
fair trade laws in the gasoline industry. The memory of those wars con-
tinues to influence scholarly commentators today,7 despite recent executive
and judicial pronouncements that have seriously questioned the wisdom
of such legislation.8
What is significant, however, is that the Government, with fair trade
legislation and the aforementioned considerations in view, is nevertheless
committed to a strong antitrust policy of deterrence of the oil refiners'
price setting practices which are designed to restrict substantially the
entrepreneurial pricing efforts of the retailers, and prevent intrabrand
competition.9 The judiciary is charged with the responsibility of construing
the antitrust laws in the light of this policy without being unduly solicitious
of personal economic theories of market stabilization.
Within this framework this Comment will examine:
(1) the recent decisions in the areas of resale price maintenance and
refusals to deal in order to determine the remaining vitality of
the Colgate'0 doctrine and to illuminate what paths remain open
for manufacturer control of retail pricing;
(2) the impact and current status of fair trade legislation in the
states and the efficacy of its application to the gasoline industry;
(3) the private antitrust enforcement procedures with a view to
determining their viability as a deterrent to anticompetitive retail
pricing; and finally
(4) state and federal franchise legislation and the feasibility of utilizing
antitrust policy in the formulation of equitable defenses to non-
antitrust actions."
At the outset, it should be noted that recent Supreme Court decisions
have demonstrated a marked tendency toward elimination of manufacturer
control over the independent retailer's business discretion.' 2 Whether these
6. M. DE CHAZAU & A. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROL-
EUM INDUSTRY 407 (1959).
7. See Dixon, Oligopoly and Price Wars: A Case Study in Gasoline, 1 ANTI-
TRUST L. & EcoN. REV. 52 (1967).
8. See text accompanying notes 63, 86-87 & 97-104 infra.
9. FTC REPORT ON GASOLINE MARKETING, supra note 4, at 28-34. See Hearings
on Distribution Problems Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Select Committee
on Small Business, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-68 (1965).
10. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
11. Although this analysis will be primarily directed toward resale price mainte-
nance, the alternative remedial deterrents suggested may have equal application to
tying arrangements and exclusive dealing, where the manufacturer's refusal to deal
is the basis of his enforcement program.
12. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) ; Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357
(1965) ; Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) ; United States v. Parke, Davis
2
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Court decisions are grounded on the government's economic policy of
eliminating anticompetitive influences in the channels of distribution, or
whether they are grounded on a broader concept of social injustice, fostered
by the abuse of economic power, is not clear from a reading of these
opinions. 13  What is evident, however, is that the Court's intervention
has served to place all on notice that the coercive use of economic power
to control the distribution of commodities in the marketplace will be subject
to close judicial scrutiny.
II. CONTRACTS, COMBINATIONS AND CONSPIRACIES, AND THE
CONCEPT OF UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL -
ECHOES OF Colgate
[Llike Hamlet's father, the ghost of Colgate continues to haunt a
part of the antitrust bar . . . and maybe it would be worth the effort
to invite the Court to expressly dispatch it.
14
Since the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 condemning,
inter alia, contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade,15
the judiciary has charted a less than precise doctrinal course in the develop-
ment of the law of resale price maintenance and refusals to deal. Early in
the Act's history, the Supreme Court decided Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons, Co.,10 which held resale price maintenance contracts
between a manufacturer and his distributors to be an unlawful restraint of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Eight years later, however,
the Court, in United States v. Colgate & Co.,17 held that a manufacturer,
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See Baker, Combinations and Conspiracies - Is There a
Difference?, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 71 (1969); Borowitz, supra note 5, at 260-61;
Groenke, What's New in the Antitrust Aspects of Selecting and Terminating Dis-
tributors, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 131, 146 (1968) ; McLaren, Marketing Limitations on
Independent Distributors and Dealers - Prices, Territories, Customers, and Handling
of Competitive Products, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 162-66 (1968).
13. Wade, supra note 5, at 40-41.
14. Panel Discussion - Marketing and Franchising: Antitrust Prognosis for
the 70's, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 502, 508 (1970) (remarks of Mr. Greenberg).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
16. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The decision may be read to have left open the question
whether a strictly vertical price-fixing agreement might be lawful as being a reason-
able restraint of trade since the Court reasoned that the series of vertical contracts in
the case produced the same effect as if the dealers had horizontally combined to fix
prices. Id. at 406-08. Later decisions of the Court, however, have clearly laid this issue
to rest. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) ; United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956) ; United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,
309 U.S. 436, 458 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,
397 (1927).
17. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). The Court distinguished Dr. Miles on the ground
that the unlawful combination created there was effected through contracts which
undertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell. Id. at 306.
Many commentators felt that Colgate had effectively undermined Dr. Miles because
a manufacturer could secure distributor acquiescence in suggested prices by simply
refusing to deal, and thus accomplish the same result which, if reached by contract,
Dr. Miles would have proscribed. See Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance, 32 YALE
L.J. 676, 691-93 (1923) ; Comment, Refusal to Sell and Public Control of Competition,
58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1127 (1949). But see Barber, Refusal to Deal Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 852-53 (1955).
650 [VOL. 18
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in the absence of an intent to create or maintain a monopoly, had the right
to announce unilaterally in advance the prices at which it demanded that
its products be resold and to refuse to deal with those distributors who
failed to conform to this policy. Colgate had implemented an elaborate
program of distribution of price schedules, notification of suspensions of
offending dealers, investigation and discovery of offenders, and requests
for assurances from dealers selling below suggested prices that they would
conform if reinstated.'5 It appeared that the Court in Colgate had re-
treated from its position in Dr. Miles.
In an attempt to clarify the apparent inconsistency of the two decisions,
the Court in United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc.,19 stated that Colgate
did not overrule or modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles, but rather that the
decision rested on the absence of an allegation of an unlawful agreement.
The majority in Schrader's purported to distinguish the situation where
an express or implied agreement exists from the situation where a manu-
facturer merely indicates his wishes concerning prices and declines further
dealings with those who fail to observe them. However, the Court noted that
an agreement between a manufacturer and retailer need not be formal to
violate the Sherman Act, but may be implied from a course of dealing or
other circumstances.
20
In the light of the Court's extension of Dr. Miles to implied agree-
ments and with a view to the reinstatement procedure employed in
Colgate, it could hardly be doubted that the doctrine announced in Colgate
had been narrowed, and in fact, divorced from the case's factual setting.
What remained of the doctrine's theoretical basis was left for future
decisions to further delimit.
In 1944, the Court, in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
21
stated that a simple refusal to deal with those who fail to maintain the
seller's fixed resale prices is lawful, but the seller may not go beyond
the exercise of this right; where he enters contracts or combinations,
express or implied, which unduly hinder the free flow of commerce, he is
then beyond the scope of the Colgate doctrine. When the above language
is read in the context of the facts of the case, the initial reading, which
18. 250 U.S. at 303. Similarly, under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. 45 (1970), the Supreme Court has held that a trader may withhold his
products from those who will not sell them at the prices fixed for their resale. FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
19. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
20. Id. at 99. But see Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208
(1921), where the Court held that the mere fact that a manufacturer indicates to
wholesalers a sales plan fixing prices below which they were not to sell to retailers,
and calls this plan repeatedly to their attention, did not suffice to establish an agree-
ment or combination, even though many conformed to the program.
21. 321 U.S. 707, 722 (1944). See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441,
452-53 (1922), where the Court adopted the principles developed under the Sherman
Act to determine what are "unfair methods of competition" within the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The Beech-Nut Company wag found to suppress the freedom of
competition by coercion of its customers through special agents of the company, by
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would inspire a belief that Colgate had been substantially undermined,
if not laid to rest, is qualified. The Court had found a conspiracy based
on the wholesalers' cooperative efforts in pricing, sales and approval of
retail licenses. Additionally, an intricate plan of discovery and reinstate-
ment of violators was in effect. When an offender was cut off he would
be reinstated upon the giving of assurances that he would maintain prices
in the future.
22
The Court's decision in Bausch & Lomb represents the point of
departure between Justices Brennan and Harlan in United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co.23  Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, read the
Court's language in Bausch & Lomb in the context of the particular
factual setting therein and reasoned that the indicia of conspiracy, con-
certed action, must be present if the Court is unable to find a contract,
either express or implied.2 4 Mr. Justice Brennan and the majority, on the
other hand, read Bausch & Lomb as establishing that the term "combina-
tion" in sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act has a meaning independent
of the terms "contract" or "conspiracy" and reasoned that:
An unlawful combination is not just such as arises from a price
maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a combination is
also organized if the producer secures adherence to his suggested
prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a
customer who will not observe his announced policy.
25
Mr. Justice Harlan warned that the majority had done no less than to
send the Colgate doctrine to its demise.2 6
Mr. Justice White, in a footnote in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,2 7 added
substance to the vague contours of the standard announced in Parke,
Davis. A combination, within the meaning of sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act, may be formed (1) between a single retailer and his sup-
plier from the time the retailer unwillingly acquiesces in the suggested
pricing policies of his supplier, or (2) between the supplier and other
retailers who have acquiesced in a pricing program induced by the com-
municated danger of termination.28
22. 321 U.S. at 720.
23. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
24. Id. at 52.
25. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 49 (dissenting opinion).
27. 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968). To indicate that the Court's language in
Albrecht is not to be taken lightly, Mr. Justice Black restated these two theories of
combination in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
142 (1968). Accord, Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Broussard
v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289
F. Supp. 884, 891 (D.R.I. 1968). See Baker, supra note 12; Panel Discussion -
Marketing and Franchising: Antitrust Prognosis for the 70's, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 502,
508 (1970) (remarks of Mr. Greenberg) ; Note, "Combinations" in Restraint of
Trade: A New Approach to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 75.
28. 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
[VOL. 18
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The thrust of the Court's recent decisions demonstrates deep con-
cern with the abuse of economic power in the market complex. With the
elimination of the requirement of concerted action, the Court has focused
on the element of coercion and has extended it beyond its traditional
meaning to include not only coercion resulting from overt action, but
also that coercion inherent in a status relationship. A prime example of
the latter is the relationship that exists between the oil refiner and gaso-
line retailer. The inequality in the bargaining positions is so pronounced
that it is often unnecessary for the supplier to resort to overt coercive
tactics in order to enforce its pricing policies.2 9
Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,30 decided in the interim between Parke,
Davis and Albrecht, underscores the nature of this relationship. There,
the Court invalidated the consignment agreement as a method by which
a supplier could enforce a program of resale price maintenance. The
Court focused on the element of coercion and reasoned that it matters
not what the coercive device is; if its effect is to enforce a scheme of
resale price maintenance on the supplier's retail outlets, a Sherman Act
violation exists. Alluding to the economic power of the oil refiners, Mr.
Justice Douglas stated:
By reason of the lease and "consignment" agreement dealers are
coercively laced into an agreement under which their supplier is able
to impose noncompetitive prices on thousands of persons whose
prices otherwise might be competitive. 81
Although the record indicated some evidence of overt coercive tactics
employed by Union Oil, the ultimate decision turned more on the Court's
recognition of the fact that the dealer-tenants were in no position to bargain
with their landlord when the only alternative was economic extinction. 2
While the Supreme Court proceeded slowly along its unpredictable
course of doctrinal development, the lower courts for the most part were
left in uncharted waters. The vagueness of the standard announced in
Parke, Davis resulted, not surprisingly, in a large number of decisions
expressing divergent views, notwithstanding the seeming clarification in
Albrecht.83 One controversy of particular interest was the First Cir-
29. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
30. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
31. Id. at 21.
32. Cf. id. at 20-21. See note 2 supra.
33. See Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) (prelimi-
nary injunction granted against termination of franchise agreement based on reasonable
likelihood of success) ; Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968) (attempted
enforcement of price-fixing agreement held illegal) ; Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d
470 (5th Cir. 1966) ; (tying arrangement may be found in course of dealings between
parties) ; Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965) (refusal
to deal in order to fix prices presented genuine issue of fact) ; Guidry v. Continental
Oil Co., 350 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1965) (evidence of consignment agreement in order
to fix prices made summary judgment inappropriate) ; LeBlanc v. Continental Oil
Co., 350 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965) (refusal to deal in order to fix prices held illegal) ;
Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965) (tying arrange-
ment may be found from course of conduct) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC,
COMMENTS
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cuit's decision in Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co.8 4 Mobil Oil involved a single
gasoline retailer who had brought suit against the refiner for violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The dealer alleged that Mobil had re-
strained trade by cancelling his lease for failing to set maximum resale
prices. However, he had neither contracted nor unwillingly acquiesced
in Mobil's pricing policies, and no allegation was made that Mobil had
enforced its prices with any other dealers. In other words, it was a
refusal to deal in its most pristine form, save for Mobil's illicit motive
to set maximum resale prices. The court of appeals, with one judge dis-
senting, dismissed the complaint for failing to allege a contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy in restraint of trade.8 5
The interest generated by the Mobil Oil decision is not due to the
opinion of the court, but rather results from the concurring and dissenting
opinions of Judge Coffin and Chief Judge Aldrich. Judge Coffin, in con-
currence, argued that the anticompetitive effects of maximum price fixing
differ markedly from the anticompetitive effects of minimum price fixing,
and reasoned that the former should not constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act.8 0 He distinguished Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons,37 in which the Supreme Court had held a maximum price-
fixing agreement violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act, on the ground
that the Kiefer-Stewart decision involved a horizontal maximum price-
fixing scheme.38 He based his distinction on the different economic effects
generated by the two distinct forms of pricing. Admittedly, had he had
331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964) (tying arrangement found) ; Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (refusal to deal in
order to fix prices illegal) ; Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963)
(refusal to deal in order to enforce tying arrangement held illegal) ; Osborn v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960) (tying arrangement had substantial effect on
interstate commerce where lessor leased about 10 per cent of all filling stations in the
state); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11, 15 (6th Cir. 1959)
(use of short-term cancellation provision for purpose of violating the law is itself a
violation of the antitrust law); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958) (conspiracy to fix prices found).
But see Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967) (no cause of action
exists where plaintiff failed to allege unwilling compliance with pricing scheme of
supplier); Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961) (no contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy found) ; Peter v. Union Oil Co., 1971 Trade Cas. ff 73,650 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (no evidence of coercion found); Hollander v. American Oil Co., 1971
Trade Cas. ff 73,738 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (refusal to deal found to be based on declining
gasoline sales and failure to keep station clean) ; South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. 11, 1965) (court found no systematic policing or other
coercive action from which a combination might be inferred) ; Hutchinson v. American
Oil Co., 221 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (no conspiracy to violate antitrust laws
found) ; Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (no conspiracy to
fix prices found).
34. 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967), noted in 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 253 (1967).
35. Id. at 276.
36. Id. at 276-77.
37. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
38. 375 F.2d at 277. Although the Fifth Circuit in Broussard v. Socony Mobil
Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965), had reversed a district court's granting of
summary judgment to an oil refiner where the issue had been whether the refiner had
terminated its lessee-dealer for failing to reinstate a maximum price-fixing contract,
Judge Coffin was not impressed by the court's reasoning.
[VOL. 18
7
McCarthy: Resale Price Maintenance, Refusals to Deal, and the Gasoline Reta
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
MARCH 1973]
the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 9
he might have silently acquiesced on this issue.
The second issue in Mobil Oil, and of far greater significance in terms
of the doctrine of refusal to deal, involved the fact that the dealer had
never agreed to the pricing policies of his supplier. While Judge Coffin
was unable to perceive a contract or combination, 40 Chief Judge Aldrich,
in his dissent, was unmoved by the absence of initial compliance. 41 He
refused to distinguish the Mobil Oil factual setting from the situations where
a dealer enters into a contract to maintain prices and thereafter declines
to act in accordance with its terms, 42 or where a dealer initially unwillingly
acquiesces in his supplier's pricing policies and thereafter refuses to
comply.
43
[I] see no difference in substance between pressure to induce the
making of an unlawful agreement and pressure to reinstate one that
has been broken. To the extent that it be suggested that the rejected
agreement in Broussard [v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th
Cir. 1965)] is what brought the case within the act, this would not
only be an unfortunate distinction, since any future "Quinn" [the
gasoline retailer] could establish rights for himself simply by making
the requested agreement one day and breaking it the next, but also,
it seems to be, an illogical one.
44
This substance-over-form rationale, when considered in conjunction
with the underlying policy of the antitrust laws, presents a formidable
argument for extension of antitrust protection. It becomes even more per-
suasive when one views the nature of the economic relationship between
the oil refiner and gasoline retailer.45 Chief Judge Aldrich posited that the
power implications of the landlord-tenant relationship, present in Mobil
Oil, served to illuminate the absolute economic dominance of the oil refiner.
This status alone supplied the requisite element of coercion. The overt
harassment tactics employed by Mobil only served to aggravate an already
untenable situation. Proceeding further with this social injustice theory,
Chief Judge Aldrich would have held that Mobil violated the Sherman
Act when it cancelled the lease in retaliation for its tenant's failure to
acquiesce in its pricing scheme.
46
Although persuasive pragmatically, there exists a fundamental con-
ceptual flaw in this analysis; that is, unless the judiciary is willing to
39. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). But see id. at 156 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For addi-
tional criticism of the Albrecht holding, see Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term,
82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 254-60 (1968).
40. 375 F.2d at 278.
41. Id. at 280.
42. Id. at 279. See Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th
Cir. 1965).
43. 375 F.2d at 279. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
44. 375 F.2d at 279 (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
45. See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
46. 375 F.2d at 279-80.
COMMENTS
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entertain a fiction, no contract, combination or conspiracy, as expressly
required by the Sherman Act, has been formed. Mobil's actions constitute
merely an attempt to contract, combine, or conspire. No amount of dis-
course on the power implications in the short-term lease consistently used
in the gasoline industry can supply this missing element. It only serves to
focus on the need for judicial alternatives or remedial legislation.
The trilogy of recent Supreme Court decisions - Parke, Davis,
Simpson, and Albrecht - shed some light on this problem. These cases
may be said to have developed a "purpose and effect" test for combinations
under the Sherman Act. A supplier's unlawful motive to fix prices,
coupled with a refusal to deal, is not sufficient, by itself, to constitute a
violation of the Act because the "effect" portion of the test requires that
at least a single dealer acquiesce, albeit unwillingly, in the pricing scheme.
47
Until this occurs, no prices have been fixed and no combination has been
formed. While it may be argued that this distinction is artificial, the
Court's only alternative would have been to open Pandora's box by reading
into the statute a proscription against attempts to contract, combine, or
conspire. Clearly, this would have gone beyond the realm of sound
statutory construction and would have run counter to congressional intent.
It is important to note that this analysis is not premised on the continuing
vitality of the Colgate doctrine, because construction of the statutory
language alone indicates that a refusal to deal under the circumstances
present in Mobil Oil is not proscribed by the Sherman Act.48
Arguably, some deterrence is provided by the fact that a manu-
facturer or supplier must attempt to enforce his pricing policies with more
than one retailer in order to implement an effective resale price-fixing
program. The likelihood that at least one dealer's unwilling acquiescence
will be secured is significantly enhanced. However, this neither alleviates
the fears of, nor provides a remedy for, the individual retailer who has
had his source of income extinguished. For even though he can adequately
demonstrate to the court that he was terminated for failing to fix prices,
this does not lighten his burden of finding another retailer willing to
testify and proving his unwilling compliance.
While one can only sympathize with the views expressed by Chief
Judge Aldrich in his dissent, any attempt to extend antitrust coverage to
the Mobil Oil situation violates sound rules of judicial construction. Con-
ceptual integrity requires that either the legislature provide the remedy
or the state judiciary permit equitable defenses grounded on federal or
47. See text accompanying note 28 supra; Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusal to Deal, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 655, 690 (1962). See also McLaren, supra note 12, at 163.
48. In fact, the Colgate doctrine only adds confusion to what are the plain
implications of the statutory language. Some commentators are misinterpreting the
Supreme Court's continuous undermining of the doctrine to suggest antitrust proscrip-
tion for all refusals to deal where the only additional element that exists is the illicit
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state antitrust policy in summary eviction proceedings.4 9 In the absence of
legislative or judicial action, the oil refiner will continue to exercise signifi-
cant control over the retailing function.
At this point it is necessary to consider another device used by the
oil refiners to control prices at the retailing functional level, and to determine
whether it provides the supplier with a viable alternative should the
former avenue be foreclosed to them.
III. THE IMPACT OF FAIR TRADE
A. Federal Enabling Legislation and the Status of Fair Trade
in the States
Fair trade had its inauspicious beginning in 1931 with the passage of
legislation in California permitting the establishment by contract of a resale
price maintenance system for trademarked commodities.50 Because of the
requirement of a contract between the vendor and any retailer he sought
to restrict, it proved unworkable in practice. This led, two years later, to
the enactment of a nonsigner provision, which permitted a vendor to
enforce fair trade legislation against any retailer who, with knowledge of
an existing contract, sold the trademarked item below its fair trade price.5'
After its initial success in California, similar legislation was enacted in 44
additional states.
52
The Supreme Court, in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram
Distillers Corp.,53 upheld the validity of such legislation, as it applied to
intrastate transactions, against a constitutional challenge that the nonsigner
provision violated due process. But the Supreme Court's decisions pro-
scribing vertical price-fixing agreements in or affecting interstate com-
merce indicated that fair trade could not withstand the strictures of the
Sherman and Federal Trade Commission 54 Acts without exempting legisla-
tion.55 As a result, the Miller-Tydings Amendment5" to the Sherman
49. See text accompanying notes 128-50 infra.
50. Diamond, Antitrust Problems of Fair Trading, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 97, 98
(1955). Mr. Justice Harlan explained the rise of fair trade legislation:
The purpose of the state fair-trade laws is to allow the manufacturer of a brand-
named product to protect the goodwill his name enjoys by controlling the prices
at which his branded products are resold.
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 317 (1956) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
51. Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting
Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 640, 644 (1936).
52. See TRADE REG. REP. 1 6041, at 9087-88 (1972). In Vermont, resale price
maintenance is valid at common law, but nonsigners are not bound. Diamond, supra
note 50, at 98 n.6.
53. 299 U.S. 183 (1936). See Conant, Resale Price Maintenance: Constitu-
tionality of Nonsigner Clauses, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1961).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
55. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); United States v.
Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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Act and the McGuire Amendment 57 to the Federal Trade Commission
Act were passed to create an exemption from the federal antitrust laws
for vertical price-fixing agreements where authorized under state fair trade
laws. Since the validity of the agreement depends on the existence of
state fair trade legislation, the federal statutes are appropriately char-
acterized as enabling legislation, and as such, do not imply congressional
approval of resale price maintenance.5 8
The McGuire Act, which largely supersedes the Miller-Tydings Act -
due to the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp.50 - provides, in Section 2, an exemption for "contracts
or agreements" prescribing stipulated prices as well as minimum prices.8 0
Thus, both minimum and maximum resale pricing can be effectuated in
those states which authorize stipulated prices.61 Section 3 of the McGuire
Act provides an exemption for enforcement against nonsigners in those
states which have nonsigner provisions.
62
Of the 45 states that intially enacted fair trade legislation, 9 have
subsequently either repealed such legislation or their courts have held it
unconstitutional under the state constitution. Of the 36 states that pre-
sently have some form of fair trade legislation, 19 have had the nonsigner
provision held unconstitutional under the state constitution. Thus, in only
17 states is fair trade legislation applicable to noncontracting parties with
knowledge of an existing fair trade agreement. Of these 17 states, only 8
permit stipulated prices in the fair trade agreement.
63
A cursory analysis indicates that there are two fundamental draw-
backs to fair trading. The first is that it can only cover a portion of the
country, as indicated above. The second is that, even in fair trade states,
the failure to enforce in a vigorous and diligent fashion will result in the
57. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
58. Lurie, Fair Trade: How Formal Must It Be?, 3 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 1
(1971). Professor Lurie described the nature and scope of the McGuire Act exemp-
tion as follows:
[T]he Act should not be viewed as an enabling act in the sense that it is a
grant of power to the states to do what they might not otherwise do, but rather
the Act should be viewed as stating that federal law will not prohibit what state
law, within limits, permits. So viewed, the federal act incorporates the terms of
the state act in each state, and conditions the legality of a price fixing scheme
under federal law upon the legality of the scheme under state law.
Id. at 5. Of course, the state may not exceed the limits prescribed by the federal
exemption. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 (1951).
59. 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The Court held that enforcement of resale price main-
tenance against nonsigners was not within the exemption due to the failure of the
Miller-Tydings Act to exempt explicitly such enforcement. The effect of this decision
was to make all efforts to enforce resale prices against nonsigners violative of the
antitrust laws. In response to this decision, Congress passed the McGuire Act in
1952 for the purpose of reinstating enforcement against nonsigners by exempting
such enforcement from the federal antitrust laws when state legislation authorizes
such enforcement.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 45(2) (1970).
61. See TRADE REG. REP. f 6041, at 9087-88 (1972).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 45(3) (1970).
63. See TRADE REG. REP. f 6041, at 9087-88 (1970).
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loss of enforcement rights . 4 A more detailed analysis will uncover addi-
tional obstacles to the use of fair trade in the gasoline industry.
B. Nature and Scope of the Exemption
"[S]ince resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a free
economy," 65 the Supreme Court has adopted a principle of strict con-
struction of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Act exemption. 66 To come
within the scope of the exemption, several conditions or limitations are
imposed: (1) there must exist a "statute, law or public policy" making
resale price maintenance agreements lawful in the state where the resale
takes place, 67 (2) the agreements must comply with the conditions or
limitations prescribed by the state law, 68 (3) the commodity to be fair
traded must be in "free and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced or distributed by others ;"9 and (4) there
is an absolute prohibition against horizontal agreements.
70
1. Degree of Formality Required
Two issues concerning fair trade have never been authoritatively re-
solved: (1) whether a producer who achieves resale price maintenance
by oral agreements or assurances without entering into formal fair trade
contracts can claim the benefit of the exemption; and (2) whether a
producer who achieves resale price maintenance by overstepping the bounds
of the Colgate doctrine and entering into nonconsensual oral or written
agreements can claim the benefit of the exemption. The essential nature
of the problem presented by these two issues may be better understood
by juxtaposing two passages taken from the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court in Schwegmann.
After examining the Miller-Tydings Act, Mr. Justice Douglas, in
writing for the Schwegmann majority, stated:
The Act sanctions only "contracts or agreements." If a distributor
and one or more retailers want to agree, combine, or conspire to
fix a minimum price, they can do so if state law permits. Their con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy - hitherto illegal - is made law-
ful . . . . When they seek, however, to impose price fixing on
persons who have not contracted or agreed to the scheme, the situation
is vastly different. That is not price fixing by contract or agreement;
64. Shulton v. Hogue & Knott, 364 F.2d 765, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1966) ; Borowitz,
supra note 5, at 259. Another drawback for some is that a dual distribution concern
cannot fair trade as to distributors with which it competes. United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). For a more detailed discussion of this problem,
see text accompanying notes 88-96 infra.
65. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956).
66. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (1970).
68. See Lurie, supra note 58, at 5-6.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(1) (1970).
70. Id. §§ 1, 45(5).
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that is price fixing by compulsion. That is not following the path of
consensual agreement; that is resort to coercion.
71
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, reasoned:
"Contracts or agreements" immunized by the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment surely cannot have a narrower scope than "contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy" in the Sherman Law. The Miller-Tydings
Amendment is an amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Law. The cate-
gory of contract cannot be given different content in the very same
section of the same act, and every combination or conspiracy implies an
agreement.
72
Both the majority and dissent in Schwegmann appear to be in full
accord with the view that consensual arrangements in the form of oral
agreements or assurances are properly immunized by the federal fair
trade exemption.73  In reference to the second issue raised above, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent may be read to have adopted an approach
which would permit extension of fair trade immunity coextensive with the
Court's expanded concepts of contract, combination, or conspiracy under
the Sherman Act. The majority, on the other hand, made it abundantly
clear that immunity only extended to consensual agreements. Recent Su-
preme Court decisions have broadened the concept of "combination" under
the Sherman Act to include not only consensual agreements, but also
nonconsensual arrangements fathered through the use of economic coer-
cion.7 4 If the analysis of the majority in Schwegmann has vitality today,
the scope of the immunity provided by the federal exemption would not
protect these nonconsensual combinations. 7 Nor does the enactment of
the McGuire Act compel a different conclusion. The McGuire Act was en-
acted in response to the Supreme Court's holding in Schwegmann that the
states' nonsigner provisions did not fall within the scope of the exemption
provided by the Miller-Tydings Act. There is no evidence to suggest that
Congress intended to expand the meaning of the phrase "contracts or agree-
ments," as found within the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, to include
nonconsensual combinations. The McGuire Act "merely provided that once
a contract or agreement existed the federal act would not prohibit the
71. 341 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
73. Accord, Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal.
1961); United States v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 150 F. Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1957).
However, numerous state and lower federal court decisions have construed particular
state fair trade acts as requiring a contract with adequate consideration. Mead John-
son & Co. v. Westchester Discount Health & Vitamin Center, 212 F. Supp. 310 (E.D.
Pa. 1962) ; Allan B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. H.R. Macy & Co., 1948-49 Trade
Cas. f" 62,481 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1949) ; General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 1955 Trade Cas.
f" 68,039 (County Ct. Ore. 1955) ; Seagram Distillers Co. v. Corensweet, 198 Tenn. 644,
281 S.W.2d 657 (1955). If the state courts construe the state's fair trade act or public
policy to require a formal contract and this requirement is not met, there is con-
siderable doubt whether the federal exemption can be claimed. See Diamond, supra
note 50, at 103; Lurie, supra note 58, at 7-11.
74. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
75. See Lurie, supra note 58, at 7.
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enforcement of any state-created right against a non-party to that con-
tract or agreement."
'76
Although this analysis is not significant in those states which have
nonsigner provisions, since an oil refiner undoubtedly would have no
difficulty in securing one consensual agreement, it is extremely im-
portant in those states which do not afford nonsigner protection.
7 7 In
these latter states, it would be necessary for the refiner to secure
consensual agreements or assurances from all of its retailers to implement
a fair trade program of resale price maintenance. Furthermore, if coer-
cive methods are employed, the resulting nonconsensual combinations
would be beyond the protection of the Colgate doctrine and outside the
scope of immunity provided by the McGuire Act.
2. Free and Open Competition
Section 5(a)(4) of the McGuire Act provides that fair trade com-
modities must be in "free and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced or distributed by others. s7 8 The Supreme
Court has never construed this section of the Act, and due to the paucity
of any judicial construction as to this section, its meaning and effect
remains obscure.
79
Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC80 is the leading federal case on the ques-
tion as to what are commodities in the same general class. The Second
Circuit held that Kodak's color film was not in the same general class
with ordinary black and white film produced by others. Since Kodak
was the only producer of color film, its product was held not to be in free
and open competition. 81 However, the Federal Trade Commission, with-
out giving reasons, subsequently modified the order when Ansco color
film was placed on the market, apparently regarding one active competitor
as constituting "free and open competition.
'82
The free and open competition requirement was designed to insure
that fair trading was limited to those commodities which must face
sufficient interbrand competition to prevent monopolization pricing.88
Since this is the policy underlying the provision, serious doubt arises as
76. Id. at 14.
77. See TRADE REG. REP. 1 6041, at 9087-88 (1972).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970).
79. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 152 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN. REPORT]. For a general discussion
of the requirement, see Herman, Free and Open Competition, 9 STAN. L. REv. 323
(1957).
80. 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947).
81. Id. at 594.
82. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 44 F.T.C. 14, 16 (1947). But one economist
has questioned whether a choice between only two products is sufficient to constitute
"free and open competition." Bowman, Resale Price Maintenance - A Monopoly
Problem, 25 U. CHI. J. Bus. 141, 146 (1952).
83. Some economists doubt the efficacy of this requirement. See, e.g., Corey,
Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 30 HARV. Bus. REV. 47, 55 (1952).
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to whether competing manufacturers who practice conscious parallelism 4
in pricing or compete in an oligopoly market structure should be per-
mitted to fair trade. Although the Supreme Court has held that con-
scious parallelism, in and of itself, is not a violation of the Sherman
Act,85 it nevertheless should be relevant to the question whether the fair
trade commodity is in free and open competition.
This was the approach adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays.0 The Pennsylvania court expressed doubt
that Gulf gasoline was in free and open competition with other brands
because all the major brands of gasoline were sold at virtually the
same price in that geographical area.87 This position is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the anti-trust laws. If the "free and open
competition" requirement is to have meaning, it should have application
to the oligopoly market structure. Competition is already restricted in
such a market. To permit fair trading only serves to restrict it further
and undermines all efforts to insure that the economy remains freely
competitive.
3. Vertical Integration
Section 5(a)(5) of the McGuire Act provides that it does not
"make lawful contracts or agreements providing for the establishment
or maintenance of minimum or stipulated resale prices . . . between
manufacturers, or between producers . . . or between retailers, or be-
tween persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other."88
The Supreme Court, in United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,8 9
interpreted this section as preventing partially integrated brand owners
from entering into fair trade agreements with their own dealers with
whom they were competing.90 However, several questions remained un-
settled after the Court's decision in McKesson.91
One such question is whether a partially integrated brand owner
can enter into fair trade contracts with noncompeting dealers and then
enforce the established price against nonsigning competing dealers where
permitted under the state statute. The weight of authority supports the
view that the fair trade exemption is inappropriate under these circum-
stances.92 To hold otherwise would allow the brand owner to circumvent
84. ATrT'v GEN. REPORT, supra note 79, at 36-42.
85. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954).
86. 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960).
87. Id. at 420, 164 A.2d at 660.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(5) (1970) (emphasis added).
89. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
90. Id. at 311-13 & n.14. McKesson's ownership of wholesale outlets precluded
it from making fair trade agreements with its competing wholesalers.
91. See Weston, Fair Trade, Alias "Quality Stabilization:" Status, Problems
and Prospects, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 76, 83-87 (1963).
92. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 834 (1957); Texas Co. v. Di Gaetano, 39 N.J. 120, 187 A.2d 721 (1963);
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the Supreme Court's holding in McKesson and render it of little practical
significance.
Another question on which there has been disagreement is whether
a limited amount of competition, such as direct selling to commercial
accounts, comes within the McKesson prohibition. Here again, the bet-
ter authority suggests that the exemption is not available. 5 But the
courts are not clear as to how substantial the competition must be.
In the gasoline industry, dual marketing techniques are a common
practice. 94 One method employed is where the oil refiner sells directly
to commercial accounts, placing it in direct competition with its retailers.
As indicated above, McKesson's principles are applicable, even though
the refiner is competing at a different functional level. A second method
employed is where the oil refiner sells through a combination of com-
pany-run service stations and independent stations, self-owned and
leased. Due to the paucity of judicial decisions, there has been no
definitive statement as to whether McKesson's principles are applicable
in this latter situation.9 5 However, since the anticompetitive effects gen-
erated by the latter marketing device are similar to those generated by
direct sales to commercial accounts, the fair trade exemption should
not be available. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission has indicated
that this marketing device has been employed by oil refiners to discipline
independent retailers for selling gasoline at prices variant from those
suggested by the refiner.96
C. Summary
Although economic arguments have been advanced justifying the
fair trade exemption on the ground that it helps to stabilize the economy,
protect the goodwill of the trademark owners, and preserve small busi-
nesses from destructive competitive pricing,97 the Federal Trade Com-
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays, 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960). For a case holding that
only competition with contracting dealers precludes fair trade, see Johnson & Johnson
v. Janel Sales Corp., 192 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
93. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 834 (1957) ; Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Blight Bros., 1960 Trade Cas. f 69,765
(C.P. Pa. 1959). But see Johnson & Johnson v. Apollo Sales, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 779
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Helena Rubinstein, Inc. v. Janel Sales Corp., 1962 Trade Cas.
70,210 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1962).
In addition, courts have divided on the question whether McKesson'sprinciples may be avoided by expressly excluding these direct sales in the fair trade
agreement. Texas Co. v. Di Gaetano, 39 N.J. 120, 187 A.2d 721 (1963) and Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Kostek, 1960 Trade Cas. 1 69,788 (C.P. Pa. 1960), refused to give effect
to contracts exempting certain classes of sales. But see Johnson & Johnson v. Apollo
Sales, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); General Electric Co. v. Hess Bros.,
Inc., 155 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
94. FTC REPORT ON GASOLINE MARKETING, supra note 4, at 25-26.
95. It has been suggested that a price-setting contract may be a fraud on the
statute if the manufacturer owned the retail firm with whom the contract was made.
California Oil Co. v. Reingold, 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62,475 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1949).
96. FTC REPORT ON GASOLINE MARKETING, supra note 4, at 26.
97. See Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967
(1955) ; Van Mell, The Case for Fair Trade, 44 ILL. B.J. 755 (1956). For views
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mission and the Department of Justice have continuously advocated
repeal of the federal exemption, reasoning that it goes beyond the
controls necessary to eliminate these problems.
98 Furthermore, the anti-
competitive controls that are left in its wake help to foster horizontal
price stabilization." The gasoline industry has been especially prone
to this dilemma, so much so that consent decrees suspending the use
of fair trade by oil refiners are commonplace, 10
0 and that commentary
:suggests that fair trade is dead. 101 Nevertheless, economic justification
still lingers. 10 2 Furthermore, there is serious doubt that the federal
exemption will be repealed, even though some states have demonstrated
a growing disenchantment with fair trade legislation.
10 3 One can only
hope that the judiciary, consonant with the principles laid down in
Schwegmann,t0 4 will continue to limit its application to volitional agree-
ments and not permit immunity to extend to nonconsensual arrangements
fathered by the dominant economic power of the brand owner. To
protect the small independent businessman from the rigors of competi-
tive pricing by eliminating his business discretion is to cure the disease
by killing the patient.
IV. PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION - THE BULWARK
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT?
The private treble damage action has been praised as the most
effective deterrent to violation of the antitrust laws.' 0 5 Mr. Justice Black
characterized this remedy as "a vital means for enforcing the antitrust
policy of the United States" and as a "bulwark of antitrust enforce-
ment."' 0 6 Despite these laudations, it is interesting to note that of the
1,696 private antitrust suits that have culminated in decisions from
1890 to 1963, only 71 have been successful, and of these, almost all fol-
critical of fair trade, see Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price
Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 825 (1955) ; Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21
U. CHI. L. REv. 175 (1954) ; Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23
(1955) ; Rahl, The Case Against Fair Trade, 44 ILL. B.J. 754 (1956).
98. See FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1945); Arr'y GEN.
REPORT, supra note 79, at 153-54.
99. ATT'Y GEN. REPORT, supra note 79, at 154.
100. United States v. American Oil Co., 1971 Trade Cas. 1 73,616 (D.N.J. 1971)
United States v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 1969 Trade Gas. 72,833 (W.D. Pa.
1969); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 1959 Trade Cas. 1 69,399 (S.D.
Cal. 1959).
101. See, e.g., Burke, "Fair trade" died ... now officially buried!, Service Station
Dealer, Sept. 1971, at 2, col. 1.
102. See Dixon, supra note 7.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 2683, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 67-70 (1945) ; TRADE REG.
REP. ff 6041, at 9087-88 (1972).
104. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
105. Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 87,
96 (1966) ; Hearings on S. 2512 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
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lowed favorable government prosecutions.' 0 7 These figures, of course,
do not include the number of cases that were settled before a complaint
was issued, or the number of lawsuits avoided because of a change
in business practices, but they are a sound indicator of how willing a
private party may be to attempt court enforcement' 08 where the cost
of suit is substantial and the chance for success marginal' 0 9
A. Economics of Private Enforcement
It has been estimated that the smallest private antitrust action will
cost a minimum of five thousand dollars to prosecute to a favorable
conclusion. 110 And if there is any doubt raised as to the financial ability
of the plaintiff to prosecute the suit, a war of attrition can be expected
as an acceptable method of defense by the large corporate defendant
and its attorneys. Pretrial procedures will be delayed and procurement
of evidence will be difficult, even after discovery orders have been signed
and executed. Protracted appeals and delays could cause the suit to
extend over a period of five years, with initial hope of success continually
waning."'
This prospect of protracted litigation, coupled with only a marginal
chance of success, acts as a deterrent to the institution of a suit, in
spite of the fact that treble damages and costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorney's fees, are recoverable." 2 In the case of a single
gasoline retailer whose livelihood depends on the continued operation of
his service station, there is no feasible economic reason to institute suit
where five years of protracted litigation is in the offing. In fact, in
terms of a treble damage action, he will not have incurred damages
until he has been terminated; by then, it is too late, for at that point
he would, in most instances, lack the financial ability to prosecute a
suit to a fruitful conclusion.
Oil refiners are not oblivious to these economic realities, and can
well afford to chance the occasion when a single retailer attempts to
enforce his rights through the courts because there are other obstacles
he must overcome before success is assured.
107. See Hearings, supra note 105, at 180-324.
108. Section 4 of the Clayton Act affords the treble damage remedy to "[a]nyperson who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws ...." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Section 16 of the Clayton
Act, the corollary on the equitable side, provides that "[a]ny person, firm, corpora-
tion, or association shall .. .have injunctive relief .. . against threatened loss ordamage by a violation of the antitrust laws .... " Id. § 26.
109. Alioto, supra note 105, at 92; Comment, In Pari Delicto and Consent as
Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241 (1965).
110. See Alioto, supra note 105, at 93.
111. Id. at 92.
112. An allowance for attorney's fees may cover the appeal of an action as wellas the original trial of the action. However, such an allowance can be made only as
an incident to the successful prosecution of the antitrust damage action. Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 399 U.S. 222 (1970) ; Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d
566 (4th Cir. 1963).
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B. Other Problems in Private Enforcement
Additional obstacles confronting the potential plaintiff include: (1)
establishing that the restraint occurred in interstate commerce, or, if
the restraint arose in intrastate commerce, that it had a substantial ad-
verse effect on interstate commerce;113 (2) establishing standing to sue
by alleging a violation of the antitrust laws, 1 4 an injury to business
or property," 5 and a causal relationship between the violation and the
113. Cf. Savon Gas Stations No. 6, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 529, 533
(D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963).
Although the commerce requirement can be succinctly stated, its applica-
tion has caused substantial difficulty. Some courts have held that the retailer's
operation must be in or affect interstate commerce, notwithstanding the fact that his
supplier's business is interstate in scope. Uniform Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
400 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal.
1951). Other courts have found that the commerce requirement is satisfied when the
products to be purchased by the retailer came from or were perfected out of state.
United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Burkhead
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Where both gasoline
production and marketing is intrastate, the courts have uniformly characterized the
operation as purely intrastate and as not substantially affecting interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Brenner v. Texas Co., 140 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal. 1956). But divergent
authority exists as to whether a gasoline retailer's consumer credit card business, or
gasoline sales to interstate travelers constitutes sufficient interstate activity so that
a restraint will substantially burden commerce. Compare Uniform Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., supra (commerce requirement not met by a showing that dealer
honored all major credit cards), with Ryan v. California Co., 1957 Trade Cas.
68,651 (D. Mont. 1957) (commerce requirement met when dealer alleged use of
consumer credit cards). Compare also Munson v. Richfield Oil Corp., 91 F. Supp. 171
(S.D. Cal. 1950) (commerce requirement met where retailer sold gasoline and oil
to interstate travelers), with Dunkel Oil Corp. v. Anich, 1944-45 Trade Cas. 57,306
(D. Ill. 1944) (commerce requirement not met where retailer sold gasoline and oil to
interstate travelers).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). Section 12 defines "antitrust laws" as including the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and sections 73-77 of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894.
Therefore, private actions for damages or injunctive relief must be based upon viola-
tions of these three laws. The Federal Trade Commission Act is not defined as an
antitrust law, and thus, suits based upon a violation of this law are not authorized.
115. Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 991 (1966).
The phrase "injury to business or property" has been construed in terms of
(1) the difference between amounts actually realized from sales and what would
have been realized but for the antitrust violation, and (2) the extent to which the
value of the plaintiff's property was diminished as a result of the antitrust violation.
Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir.
1959). Thus, the loss of profits, Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616
(7th Cir. 1959), and the loss of goodwill, Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co.,
162 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), have been recognized as injuries to business or
property within the meaning of the statute. However, a person prevented from en-
gaging in a business by reason of an antitrust violation is not injured in his business
or property, unless he can show that he intended to engage in the business and was
prepared to do so. Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra; Triangle Conduit &
Cable Co. v. National Elec. Prod. Corp., 152 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1945); Denver
Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969). But recovery
has been allowed where there was a conspiratorial breach of a contract, the per-
formance of which would have enabled the plaintiff to engage in a business. North
Texas Producers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962).
In contrast with an action for damages, a person seeking injunctive relief
under section 16 of the Clayton Act need not show actual injury; a showing of a
dangerous probability of injury is sufficient. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) ; Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
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injury claimed;116 and (3) proving recognizable damages, 117 including
reduced profits on actual sales," 8 lost profits on lost sales," 9 overcharges
on purchases actually made by the plaintiff, 120 and injury to capital or
goodwill.1
21
It is evident from the foregoing survey of the multifaceted require-
ments in private enforcement that for the average gasoline retailer, who
has the temerity to challenge the pricing policies of his supplier, the
treble damage action normally is not a viable remedy for or deterrent
against antitrust violations. The economic realities and the onerous bur-
116. Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966).
The third requirement of standing, causal relationship, has been defined in
such terms as direct or proximate damages. Remote, indirect, or derivative injuries
are not recoverable under the Clayton Act. Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security
Bank, 369 F.2d 19, 25-26 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967);
Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., supra. But, to illustrate how far
some courts have gone in finding damages proximately resulting from an antitrust
violation, the Ninth Circuit granted a landlord of a gasoline dealer standing to sue
Union Oil for violation of the Sherman Act where the refiner had attempted to
exclude all but its products from the station, including those of the plaintiff. The
court held that the station owner was within the "target area" of the defendant's
alleged conduct. Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967). But the
weight of authority suggests that a much stricter standard of causation is the
general rule rather than the exception. See, e.g., Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F.
Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958); Libman v. Sun Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1954) ;
Farmers Co-operative Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 51 F. Supp. 440 (N.D.
Iowa 1943); Miller Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 37 F. Supp. 831 (E.D.
Mo. 1941).
117. See generally Greenwald, The Measurement of Damages in Private Anti-
trust Suits, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 293 (1960) ; McConnell, Proof of Damages in an
Antitrust Case, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 39 (1962); Rowley, Proof of Damages in
Antitrust Cases, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 75 (1966).
118. E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGES ANrlTRUST ACTIONS 309 (1965).
This category includes the situation where a purchaser for resale establishes that he
was a party to a maximum resale price maintenance agreement with his supplier.
119. Id. This category encompasses the situation where a retailer lost sales because
he was unable to obtain merchandise because of an unlawful refusal to deal or an
exclusive dealing arrangement. Lost profits may be established by evidence showing
the general state of the industry involved, Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d
873 (7th Cir. 1970), past earnings of the injured party, Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's
Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966) ; Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d
459 (9th Cir. 1964), anticipated sales, Kobe, Inc. v. Demsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416
(10th Cir. 1952), or the profits of other comparable businesses, North Texas
Producers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962).
120. E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 118, at 312. This category includes the situation
where the retailer is paying a higher price than other customers of a common supplier.
In the gasoline industry this category may encompass the zone-pricing technique
employed by oil refiners whereby price allowances are granted to certain dealers
on the condition that they drop their prices to a level competitive with neighboring
dealers in rival brands of gasoline. The Supreme Court has indicated that recovery
may be based on the difference between the higher price paid by the plaintiff and
the lower price paid by other retailers of the common supplier. Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). The traditional rule had been to
limit damages to the lost profits resulting from the discrimination. See, e.g., Enter-
prise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959).
121. E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 118, at 342. This category includes the situations
where the plaintiff is driven entirely out of business by the defendant's antitrust
violation or where the plaintiff continues though his business is impaired. In these
situations, it is possible that injury to capital or goodwill may overlap damages in
the form of lost profits. See Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
But see Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957).
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dens of proving the elements necessary to the basic cause of action
indicate that few retailers can embark upon the course of private en-
forcement as presently designed. Faced with this dilemma, the retailer
will in all likelihood acquiesce in his termination and seek another
location with a different refiner in the hope that his new supplier will
not adopt the pricing policies of his former supplier.
V. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIAL DETERRENTS
A. Introduction
As has been previously noted, the current trend in Supreme Court
decisions indicates that the judiciary is striving to reinforce the Govern-
ment's policy of eliminating anticompetitive influences in the channels
of distribution to insure that competition remains active and markets
free. The Court has assumed an active role in strengthening the private
enforcement action by broadening the concept of "combination" under
the Sherman Act, 12 2 by restricting the federal fair trade exemption, 123
and by limiting the defenses available to the antitrust violator.124 But
the two factors discussed earlier, the nature of the private enforcement
action 25 and the inherent limitation of the Sherman Act 2 6 have partially
obstructed the Court's efforts.
At present, the burden more often than not falls upon the small
businessman to institute suit to vindicate a contract right already lost,
or to recover damages to a business relationship already terminated. As
already indicated, the cumbersome nature of the judicial machinery, and
the delaying tactics employed by the large corporate defendant have
resulted in protracted litigation which has often frustrated private en-
forcement. In addition, expansion of conceptual principles under the
Sherman Act may have reached its limit.' 27 To deter further violations
it has become necessary to furnish alternative remedial deterrents to
supplement the remedies presently available, and to shift the burden
to the violator.
B. Federal Antitrust Policy as a Basis for Equitable
Defenses in Non-Antitrust Actions
While there is no question that the states lack jurisdiction to enter-
tain an affirmative claim for relief under the federal antitrust laws,
128
122. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 73-77 & 88-96 supra.
124. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968)
(rejected the in pari delicto defense) ; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (rejected the passing-on defense).
125. See notes 105-21 and accompanying text supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 15-49 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 33-49 supra.
128. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922);
Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 237 La. 132, 110 So. 2d 553 (1959); Gold Fuel
Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 32 N.J. 459, 161 A.2d 246 (1960).
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a significant number of state courts have held that they have jurisdiction
to entertain defenses based on federal antitrust policy.' 29 Thus, a con-
tract 30 and a lease l '' were held unenforceable in the New York courts
because they violated the Clayton Act.' 3 2  Likewise, an agreement to
arbitrate was held unenforceable where the relief sought from arbitra-
tion would have constituted a violation of the Clayton Act.'83  An oil
company was denied the right to exercise an option to purchase a gas
station where the contract also contained an exclusive dealing provision,
and the option was being used to enforce this unlawful provision.
3 4
These decisions indicate that there is a growing public policy that state
courts should not grant relief in a non-antitrust action where the effect
of the decision would be to give impetus to a violation of the federal
antitrust laws.
A recurring problem that exists in the gasoline industry is the oil
refiner's termination of the gasoline retailer's lease in retaliation for
the latter's refusal to fix gasoline prices. 3 5 A summary eviction pro-
ceeding usually follows with the oil refiner seeking to eject its dealer-
tenant for holding over beyond the lease term. In response to the re-
finer's claim for relief, the dealer asserts the equitable defense that its
supplier is refusing to deal because of the dealer's failure to implement
a resale price maintenance scheme in violation of the Sherman Act.
The few courts that have dealt with this precise issue have refused to
entertain the defense on the ground that the retailer has an adequate
remedy at law.' 36 But this rationale is of questionable validity since,
as has been noted, there is serious doubt that the treble damage action
is an effective remedy under these circumstances. 3 7 To provide both
an attainable remedy and an effective deterrent, it would seem more
appropriate for the state court to allow the aforementioned defense,
129. Alpha Beta Food Mkts., Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal. App. 2d
343, 305 P.2d 163 (1956); Big Top Stores, Inc. v. Ardsley Toy Shoppe, Ltd., 1970
Trade Cas. 1 73,379 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1970) ; Standardbred Owners Ass'n v. Yonkers
Raceway, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. if 70,980 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1963) ; F.W. Stock & Sons,
Inc. v. Jacobson, 173 Misc. 621, 18 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Remington Rand,
Inc. v. IBM, 167 Misc. 108, 3 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Ainsworth v. Cooper
Underwear Co., 227 App. Div. 837, 237 N.Y.S. 301 (1929) ; Revlon, Inc. v. Capitol
Beauty Supply Co., 1962 Trade Cas. if 70,464 (C.P. Pa. 1962). Contra, AMF
Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348 (1961);
Loew's, Inc. v. Somerville Drive-In Theatre Corp., 54 N.J. Super. 224, 148 A.2d
599 (1959).
130. F.W. Stock & Sons, Inc. v. Jacobson, 173 Misc. 621, 18 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup.
Ct. 1939).
131. Ainsworth v. Cooper Underwear Co., 227 App. Div. 837, 237 N.Y.S. 301
(1929).
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14 et seq. (1970).
133. City Trade & Indus., Ltd. v. New Cent. Jute Mills Co., 25 N.Y.2d 49, 250
N.E.2d 52, 302 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1969).
134. Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Armaiz, 1962 Trade Cas. if 70,247 (Sup. Ct.
P.R. 1961).
135. FTC REPORT ON GASOLINE MARKETING, supra note 4, at 31.
136. Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1970);
Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc. v. Gamco, Inc., 76 R.I. 54, 68 A.2d 20 (1949).
137. See text accompanying notes 105-21 supra.
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thus placing the legal and financial burden on the large corporate entity
to defend its actions.
The development of the law with respect to the residential lease pro-
vides compelling support for this view. While it is the general rule that
a landlord may refuse to renew a lease for any legal reason or for no
reason at all, it has been held that he may not evict in retaliation for
the tenant's reporting of housing code violations to the authorities. This
principle of retaliatory intent, first announced by the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Edwards v. Habib,13 has had increasing application in the
residential setting, and has been adopted by several courts'39 and legis-
latures 140 throughout the country. Some jurisdictions have thought the
rule so fundamental as to reach constitutional dimension. Thus, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
found:
The effect that a rule of law permitting retaliatory evictions would
have on tenants cannot be discounted. There would be no point in
a tenant trying to improve conditions in a building that he would
not be allowed to continue to live in. Permitting retaliatory evic-
tions would thus inhibit him in the exercise of his constitutional rights
or, in the words of the Supreme Court, have a chilling effect.
We accordingly hold that the 14th amendment prohibits a state
court from evicting a tenant when the overriding reason the land-
lord is seeking the eviction is to retaliate against the tenant for an
exercise of his constitutional rights.
1 4 1
Whether the doctrine is viewed as being constitutionally grounded
or simply based on a strong social policy, its foundation rests on the
existence of an inequality in the bargaining positions of the respective
parties. 142 Thus, in a commercial setting where a similar foundation
exists, the doctrine should have equal application. Inequality in bargain-
ing positions, coupled with the strong economic and social policy under-
lying the Sherman Act, provides compelling support for the application
and development of the doctrine that a supplier-lessor has the right
to refuse to deal for any legal reason or for no reason at all, provided
his refusal is not designed to implement a program to violate state or
138. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
139. See, e.g., Hosey v. Club Van Cortland, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
Alexander Hamilton Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 N.J. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7
(1969) ; Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
140. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-540a (Supp. 1973) ; ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 80, § 71 (1971) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (Supp. 1972) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A: 42-10.10, 42-10.12 (Supp. 1972) ; PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp.
1973).
141. Hosey v. Club Van Cortland, 299 F. Supp. 501, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf.
McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) ; Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson,
204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962). But cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972); Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 415 P.2d 33, 51 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966).
142. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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federal antitrust laws.1 43 This doctrine avoids the technical requirement
of establishing a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade in that it reaches conduct antecedent to that stage. At the same
time, the principle is limited to those situations where the supplier and
purchaser have greater commercial ties than a simple buy and sell ar-
rangement. The joint venture aspects of the refiner-retailer relation-
ship 4 4 strongly suggest that there is a need to afford legal protection
antecedent to the existence of a Sherman Act violation. With this sup-
plemental protection a more effective deterrent to antitrust violations
is supplied.
However, this alone is not sufficient to redress the balance of power,
because the burden of proof still rests on the lessee-dealer to prove the
elements of coercion and retaliatory intent.1 5 The difficulty in proving
a supplier's motive or design in terminating a dealer renders the above
rule of limited practical significance without the adoption of a second
principle developed in the residential setting.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp.,146 recently had occasion to consider another aspect of the problem
first raised in the Edwards case. 147 In Robinson, a tenant had withheld
rent pursuant to decisional law in the District of Columbia which per-
mitted such action when a unit is rendered unsafe and unsanitary by
substantial housing code violations. The landlord brought suit to chal-
lenge the tenant's action, but it was upheld. Thereafter, the landlord
served the tenant with a 30-day notice to quit the premises, indicating
that it was unwilling to make the repairs and that it intended to take
the property off the housing market. In the court action that followed,
the tenant asserted the defense of retaliatory intent. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that the defense was not applicable
on the facts of the case. 1 48 In reversing the federal district court which
had affirmed, the District of Columbia Circuit not only held that the
defense was available, but additionally stated that where an unexplained
eviction follows a tenant's successful assertion of protected rights, a
rebuttable presumption of retaliation is established, at which point it
is incumbent upon the landlord to demonstrate "that he is motivated
by some legitimate business purpose rather than by the illicit motive
which would otherwise be presumed.' 149 The court went on to emphasize
143. At least one state, Hawaii, has dealt directly with this problem through
legislation :
No person shall refuse to sell any commodity to, or to buy any commodity from,
any other person or persons, when the refusal is for the purpose of compelling
or inducing the other person or persons to agree to or engage in acts which, if
acceded to, are prohibited by the state's antitrust law.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-6 (1968).
144. Gasoline Retailer, May 1971, at 1, col. 4.
145. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
146. 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
147. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
148. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 267 A.2d 833, 835 (D.C. App. 1970).
149. 463 F.2d at 865.
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that a landlord's desire to remove a tenant because he is not paying
rent is not a legitimate purpose, in that he does so pursuant to his right
guaranteed by the housing code.
Projecting this principle to the commercial setting thus far envisioned,
the doctrine would become operative in the situation where the land-
lord-refiner employs coercive tactics in an attempt to implement a scheme
violative of the antitrust laws, the tenant-dealer refuses to accede to
its policies, and within a reasonable time thereafter an unexplained evic-
tion results. In this setting a rebuttable presumption should be estab-
lished that the refiner's action is in retaliation for the dealer's refusal
to comply with its anticompetitive policies. The result of establishing such
a rule would be that the dealer, in order to establish his equitable de-
fense in a summary eviction proceeding, need only demonstrate the coer-
cion employed by his supplier and his refusal to acquiesce. At this point,
the burden of proof would shift to the supplier to demonstrate that it
is motivated by a legitimate business purpose. If the supplier fails to
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose, the lease term would continue
and he must continue to supply the dealer. 150
This approach has the distinct advantage of avoiding recourse to
the private antitrust action and the problems associated with it. But,
to maintain that this solution is replete with virtue and devoid of vice
is to overlook the true nature of the problem. What must be remembered
is that the court would be forcefully continuing a business relationship
without alleviating the animosity that has been engendered by the actions
of the respective parties. This may, of course, only indicate that the
fundamental soundness of this approach lies not in its effectiveness as
a remedy for antitrust violations, but rather in its resultant effective-
ness as a deterrent against such violations.
C. State and Federal Franchise Legislation
1. Introduction
Franchising as a method of distribution has been lauded as harnessing
the best features of small independent entrepreneurship with the best
features of large corporate enterprise. The franchisor is provided with the
ingenuity and incentive of the small businessman, and the franchisee is
provided with the security, experience, and capitalization of the corporate
establishment. 15' In addition, the franchise system is said to provide a
150. This does not mean that the dealer is entitled to remain in possession in
perpetuity. If the illegal purpose is dissipated, the landlord-refiner can, in the absence
of legislation or 'a binding contract, evict the dealer. But, as was noted in Edwards,
the landlord-refiner may not be able to disprove an illicit motive unless he can show
a legitimate affirmative reason for eviction. 397 F.2d at 702 n.53.
151. See Axelrad, Practising Law Institute - Franchising and Dual Distribution,
11 ANTITRUST BULL. 533 (1966) ; Handler, Statement Before the Small Business
Administration, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 417 (1966); Rudnick & Rudnick, Some Solu-
tions to the Problems of Maintaining Quality Standards, Eliminating Unethical
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counterweight to industrial concentration, both by encouraging manu-
facturers to forego vertical integration and by creating viable interbrand
competition for large integrated concerns. 5 2 Franchising's hybrid nature
has prompted some commentators to suggest that new antitrust principles
should be developed which would permit a modicum of control by the
franchisor as the quid pro quo for its promises under the franchise agree-
ment and to protect the goodwill of its branded commodity. 153 However,
the antitrust laws as yet do not recognize franchising as a special form
of marketing. 54 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the validity of two of
the arrangments commonly utilized in franchising, stated that sufficient
knowledge concerning the economic and social ramifications of this market-
ing technique was not then available in order to determine intelligently
whether it should be tested under the rule of reason or treated as per-
niciously anticompetitive and thus per se unlawful. 155 What can be pre-
dicted, however, with some degree of certainty, is that while new principles
may be developed which will sanction some of the restraints of trade found
in the modern franchise agreement, the tying and resale price maintenance
arrangements attacked in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,156 and Simpson
v. Union Oil Co.157 will not be benevolently viewed by the Supreme Court,
for these serve little purpose beyond the suppression of competition.
158
It is in the above context that we turn to an examination of the
Automobile Dealer Franchise Act' 9 and New Jersey's Franchise Practices
Act.' 60 Each respectively represents the first major federal and state
legislation in franchise regulation.
2. The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act and New Jersey's
Franchise Practices Act - A Study in Contrast
In an effort to realign the balance of economic power in the auto-
mobile dealer-manufacturer relationship, Congress afforded the dealer
Practices, Supervising Promotions and Ensuring Successful Management of Fran-
chised and Non-Franchised Retail Outlets, 11 ANTITRUST BULL, 509, 511 (1966);
Slater, Franchising and Dual Distribution, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (1966) ; Zeidman,
Remarks of Philip F. Zeidman, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 455 (1966); Hearings Before
the Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1728-40 (1963).
152. Handler, supra note 151, at 419.
153. See note 151 supra.
154. Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) ; FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). See Wilson, An Emerging Enforcement Policy
for Franchising, 15 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1969).
155. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
156. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
157. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
158. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)
(tying prefabricated houses to loans) ; FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968)
(tying leases and gasoline contracts to tires, batteries, and accessories) ; Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd except on damage
issue, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1971) (tying trademarks
to supplies). See Wilson, Some Problems Relative to Franchise Arrangements, 11
ANTITRUST BULL. 473 (1966).
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970).
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
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supplemental relief by enacting the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.''
Adoption of the statute followed an extensive investigation of automobile
marketing practices by congressional committees and the Federal Trade
Commission. On the basis of such investigation, it was concluded that
concentration of economic power in automobile manufacturing had de-
veloped to the point where new legislative methods and changes in
established concepts were required.
6 2
As initially designed, the Act would have protected the franchise
distributor from the arbitrary actions of his supplier. 63 However, the
House Judiciary Committee modified the Senate's version of the bill,
deleting the term "nonarbitrary" and the provision which required each
party to the franchise to preserve all the equities of the other party that
are inherent in the franchise relationship.6 4 In its final form, the Act's
purpose was to supplement the federal antitrust laws by granting the
dealer a cause of action for damages when the automobile manufacturer
failed to act in "good faith" in performing or complying with any of the
provisions in the franchise agreement, or in terminating, cancelling, or
failing to renew a dealer's franchise.
165
Section 1221(e) of the Act states:
[T]he term "good faith" shall mean the duty of each party to any
franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in a fair
and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or
intimidation from the other party: Provided, That recommendation,
endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not be
deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.
166
Consonant with the legislative history, this statutory requirement of "good
faith" has been interpreted narrowly so as to require an element of coercion
or intimidation on the part of the manufacturer. 167 One court stated that
an indispensable element of the cause of action is not lack of good faith in
the ordinary sense, but lack of good faith in which coercion, intimidation
or threats thereof are at least implicit."' In other words, the automobile
dealer is not protected against the manufacturer's arbitrary refusal to renew
161. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970). The policy underlying the Act was to estab-
lish a balance of power between manufacturers and dealers in the automotive industry
by curtailing the economic advantages of the manufacturer and increasing those of
the dealers. Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 127 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962).
162. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
163. Id. at 8; S. REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956).
164. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1956).
165. Id. at 2.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1970).
167. Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 433 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1970); accord,
Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967) ; Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,
328 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1964).
168. Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645, 646 (3d Cir.
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the franchise unless he can demonstrate some element of coercion. 169
Consequently, while the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act reaches manu-
facturer controls which may be antecedent to the formation of a contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, the narrow construction of
"good faith" has limited the Act's effectiveness. 170
The wide disparity in the relative bargaining positions of the parties
in the automotive industry is similar to that which exists in the oil refiner-
gasoline retailer relationship. Because of this fact, New Jersey has taken
the intiative to enact similar franchise legislation to realign the balance of
power in the latter relationship.
171
Section 10-5 of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act provides:
It shall be a violation of this act for a franchisor to terminate, cancel
or fail to renew a franchise without good cause. For the purposes of
this act, good cause for terminating, canceling, or failing to renew a
franchise shall be limited to failure by the franchisee to substantially
comply with those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise. 172
It is clear from this statutory language that the concept of "good
cause" differs fundamentally from the "good faith" requirement of the
Automobile Dealer Franchise Act in that the former places the burden on
the supplier to justify the termination of its dealer-franchisee. In effect, the
New Jersey legislature has provided the dealer-franchisee with a remedy
for the arbitrary actions of his supplier, even absent a showing of overt co-
ercion. Support for this interpretation is found in Shell Oil Co. v. Mar-
inello."3 Here a dealer-franchisee sought injunctive relief against eviction
169. Automobile dealers, for example, absent coercion and wrongful demands, are
not protected against "arbitrary" business decisions with respect to relocation or
termination of dealership. Unionvale Sales Ltd. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.,
299 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); accord, R.A.C. Motors, Inc. v. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 314 F. Supp. 681 (D.N.J. 1970). However, an automobile manu-
facturer was held liable to a dealer for wrongful termination of the franchise, where
the dealer proved coercion and subsequent termination of the automobile distributor-
ship for failure to adhere to the manufacturer's resale price. Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot,
Inc., 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
170. See, e.g., Berry Bros. Buick, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 257 F. Supp. 542
(E.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 552 (3d Cir. 1967), in which the court held that an
automobile manufacturer who simply did not renew a dealer's franchise after fulfilling
its part of the agreement was not liable for failing to act in good faith.
Although the Act has no provision for injunctive relief, and section 16 of the
Clayton Act has been held not to be available to provide this relief, Bateman v. Ford
Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962), the judiciary has granted injunctive relief
under its general equitable powers. Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 718
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Madsen v. Chrysler Corp., 261
F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1966) ; Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264,
137 N.W.2d 314 (1965).
Many courts have held that defendants who are or may be guilty of anti-
competitive practices should not be permitted to terminate franchises, leases, or sales
contracts when such termination would effectuate those practices. Semmes Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d
69 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.
1965) ; Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Bateman
v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962).
171. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
172. Id. § 56:10-5.
173. 120 N.J. Super. 257, 294 A.2d 253 (1972).
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by Shell after the lease term had expired. The court stated that there was no
question that the lease and franchise agreements involved in the case were
intended by the legislature to be subject to the Act, but it noted that they
did not come within the purview of the statute, because they had been
executed prior to its effective date.174 Nevertheless, the court implied a
covenant in the agreements which required Shell to renew the franchise as
long as Marinello substantially performed his obligations under the fran-
chise agreement. It reasoned that the Franchise Practices Act had, in
effect, incorporated this covenant in every agreement executed after the
effective date of the Act.175 In reaching its decision to imply a similar
covenant in the the Marinello agreements, the court focused on the nature
of the relationship and the reasonable expectations of the parties, and noted
that the joint venture aspects of the Shell-Marinello relationship indicated
that the respective interests of the parties transcended those of the classic
landlord-tenant relationship.
17 6
Another factor that influenced the court was the coercive element
that permeated the relationship. This element was derived not from the
overt actions of Shell or its representatives, but from the inherent nature
of the refiner-dealer relationship. Quoting with approval a passage taken
from the Fifth Circuit opinion of Judge Wisdom in Shell Oil Co. v.
FTC,'77 the court accurately assessed the status-oriented nature of the
coercion:
A man operating a gas station is bound to be overawed by the great
corporation that is his supplier, his banker, and his landlord. When
he hears that Shell will benefit from his patronage ... the velvet glove
of request has within it the mailed fist of command.171
Thus, as interpreted by the superior court, the New Jersey Franchise
Practices Act differs markedly from the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act
in two important respects. First, it is a product of the more recent Supreme
Court rhetoric which has emphasized the status-oriented nature of the
coercion inherent in the relationship.17  Second, in recognition of this
fact, the New Jersey legislature has placed the burden on the franchisor
to justify the termination or nonrenewal of a franchise by a showing of
good cause, thus prohibiting arbitrary conduct by the franchisor and re-
moving from the franchisee the burden of establishing overt coercive
conduct. In addition, to safeguard further the dealer's newly acquired
rights, the statute prohibits the imposition of unreasonable standards of
performance upon the franchisee'8 0 and prevents the dealer-franchisee
174. Id. at 259-60. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-8 (Supp. 1972).
175. 120 N.J. Super. at 375, 294 A.2d at 263.
176. Id. at 372, 294 A.2d at 261.
177. 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966).
178. 120 N.J. Super. at 373, 294 A.2d at 261.
179. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
180. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(e) (Supp. 1972).
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from waiving any of the protective safeguards afforded by the Act. 18 ' As a
result, the Act provides a comprehensive scheme of enforcement to redress
the balance of power in the relationship and to insure the free exercise of
the dealer's business discretion.
By reason of its comprehensiveness and the direction of its approach,
the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act goes further in safeguarding the
business discretion of the small businessman than any of the other remedial
deterrents suggested or presently in effect. This may account for the
scramble by some major oil refiners to avoid its effects by forward inte-
gration.'8 2 While the exact contours of the protections afforded by the
Act must be left for future judicial delineation, there is little doubt that
the Act, to date, is the most far-reaching legislation in the area.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored the nature of the relationship that exists
between the oil refiner and gasoline retailer to illuminate the avenues of
price control presently open to the corporate trademark owner. Analysis
has focused on the Supreme Court's efforts to provide more effective
remedial deterrents within the framework of the Sherman Act in order to
demonstrate the ultimate limitation of this doctrinal course. The limitations
inherent in the private antitrust enforcement action were discussed to
demonstrate that present antitrust protection is inadequate to afford a
comprehensive and effective deterrent to violations of the antitrust laws,
wherever one party to an intimate business relationship holds a dominant
economic position. Finally, alternative remedial deterrents were analyzed
to illustrate what methods could be implemented by the state judiciaries or
the legislatures in order to assure adequate deterrence of anticompetitive
controls.
Although the prospect exists that the development of.effective regula-
tion of large corporate controls could eventually lead to vertical integration
and the elimination of a segment of small business enterprise, the focus of
recent judicial and legislative pronouncements suggest that this risk must




181. Id. § 56:10-7(a).
182. Record (Hackensack, N.J.), Oct. 29, 1972, at c-14, col. 3.
See Wilson, supra note 158, at 488.
183. FTC REPORT ON GASOLINE MARKETING, supra note 4, at 40.
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